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Acting at the margins – Italian mnemonic activism in the European 
Parliament
This article contributes to the analysis of the complex dynamics behind the 
construction of EU memory politics in the European Parliament by focusing on 
an understudied group of actors: Italian Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs). Italian MEPs so far have remained on the margins of most of the main 
European Parliament initiatives regarding memory politics. The only exception 
to this rule could be observed during the accession process of Slovenia and 
Croatia. This article contextualises all instances of mnemonic activism of the 
Italian MEPs in the period 1999-2019. It investigates the specific narratives put 
forward by Italian actors and their embedding in the wider European memory 
framework by studying debate protocols, motions for resolutions, parliamentary 
questions and minutes of working group meetings in the EP.
Agir aux marges - Activisme mnemonique au Parlement européen
Cet article contribue à l’analyse des dynamiques complexes qui animent la 
construction de politiques mnémoniques au Parlement européen. Pour se faire, 
cette étude se focalise sur un ensemble d’acteurs qui sont sous-analysés : les 
députés italiens du Parlement européen. Jusqu’à maintenant, les eurodéputés 
italiens sont restés à l’écart de la plupart des principales initiatives du Parle-
ment européen sur les politiques de mémoire. La seule exception à la règle 
a eu lieu pendant les procédures d’accession de la Slovénie et la Croatie. Cet 
article place dans leur contexte tous les exemples d’activisme mnémonique 
émanant des eurodéputés italiens dans la période 1999-2019. Cette enquête 
porte sur les discours spécifiques des acteurs italiens, et sur le lien entre ces 
discours et le cadre de mémoriel européen. La méthodologie utilisée à cette 
fin est l’étude des comptes rendus in extenso des débats, propositions de 
















































































Acting at the margins – Italian 







When Silvio Berlusconi – then Prime Minister of Italy – suggested during a speech in the European Parliament (EP) in 2003 that German MEP 
Martin Schulz should take on the role of ‘kapò’, or Nazi concentration camp 
supervisor, in an upcoming Italian film, he caused considerable uproar in both 
the assembly and the media (Corriere della Sera, 2003; The Guardian, 2003a; 
de Volkskrant, 2003). Across the different political groups, MEPs criticised not 
only the inappropriate attack on one of their colleagues but also the shameless 
instrumentalisation of the history of the Second World War for political aims 
(Oakley, 2003). Only one group stayed surprisingly silent during and after the 
assembly’s meeting: all reactions by Italian MEPs condemning their Prime 
Minister’s remarks remained rather limited (The Guardian, 2003b). The ‘kapò 
incident’, however, is not the only example of notable silence on the part of 
the Italian EP members when it comes to mobilisation around history and 
memory issues. If one analyses the number of interventions in the different 
institutional fora of the EU, it is striking that Italian representatives are 
not very vocal. Italian politicians’ involvement in both formal and informal 
working groups dealing with the memory of totalitarian regimes has also 
been remarkably low. And they have contributed very little to, and were very 
sceptical of, recent projects like the House of European History (Milošević, 
field notes based on an interview with Morganti, 20 March 2014).
This is paradoxical; one would expect a heightened interest in issues of war 
memory among Italians, due to the country’s own experience with Fascism 
and its very busy commemorative calendar (De Luna, 2015). Identifying 
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the Italian EP group has furthermore traditionally been very engaged in EP 
discussions and initiatives. There seems to be only one exception to their 
pronounced silence in matters of war memory: during the accession process 
of Slovenia and Croatia, Italian MEPs were highly engaged. Not only did they 
display a pronounced interest in agreements concerning border issues and the 
free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, but they also unrolled 
a number of issues that had caused diplomatic quarrels in the past, and that 
were all connected to history and memory questions (Geddes and Taylor, 
2013). Among them was the issue of the Foibe – natural sinkholes where 
Yugoslav partisans during the Second World War executed Italian civilians 
in a retaliation movement for the previous two decades of Italian occupation, 
suppression and war crimes –, the question of the expulsion of Italians from 
Istria and Dalmatia (now in Slovenian and Croatian territory) right after 
the Second World War, and debates on crimes committed by the Communist 
regime between 1945 and 1948. The Italian MEPs’ general silence in European 
memory debates, and the vehemence with which they suddenly sprang into 
action when it came to discussing past Italo-Slovene-Croatian relations, raise 
a number of questions. Why has Italian activism regarding memory politics 
in the EP remained largely at the margins? Where can we instead observe 
the activation of certain narratives and contested memories? How does this 
relate to the European Parliament’s attempts at building a transnational view 
of Europe’s experience of war and dictatorship?
In this article we will contextualise what we call the ‘mnemonic activism’ 
(see Sierp, 2017; Sierp and Wüstenberg, 2015) of the Italian MEPs. We will 
investigate the specific narratives that are put forward by Italian actors and 
analyse their embedding in the wider European memory framework. The aim 
of the article is to study the emergence and development of narratives from 
a geographical area that so far has remained understudied. While there is a 
considerable amount of research on the mobilisation of Central and Eastern 
European representatives in the different EU institutions (see i.e. Neumayer, 
2019; Perchoc, 2015; Littoz-Monnet, 2013), research on southern European 
political actors in the EP has until now remained scarce. By studying plenary 
debate protocols, motions for resolutions, parliamentary questions and 
minutes of working group meetings, this article contributes to the analysis of 
the complex dynamics behind the construction of EU memory politics in the 
European Parliament. The analysis is based on data coming from the EU data 
repository EURLex, the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) 
in Florence, the Historical Archives of the European Parliament (HAEP) and 















































































period 1998-2019 were extracted using a combination of relevant keywords.1 
113 documents were analysed in depth using frame analysis. We followed 
Barry Schwartz’s (1996) idea of memory as a social frame. Compared to more 
traditional approaches centred on the notion of political action frame or other 
frames of memory, Schwartz’s framework concentrates on the mechanisms 
that render the “past a program of the present” (910). By keying one event into 
another, actors use references to past events for the interpretation of current 
situations. Incidentally, most mnemonic activity was recorded between 1998-
2014, covering the time span between the beginning of accession negotiations 
with Slovenia and the joining of Croatia. We focused wherever possible on the 
non-final versions of documents in order to trace the development of memory 
mobilisations in the EP.
Memory Activism in the European Parliament
Out of all European institutions, the European Parliament has been the most 
active in memory politics. Ever since actors in the European Parliament, 
the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) or the 
Council of Europe (CoE) started to show interest in the question of memory 
and identity, politicians in the EP have been at the forefront of debates and 
disputes on the transnationalisation of memory narratives. While memory 
and identity politics had been considered for a very long time almost exclusive 
prerogatives of the nation state, in more recent times one can observe a clear 
shift away from the national towards both the local and the transnational. 
The European Parliament, as an arena combining to a certain extent all three 
levels (the local, the national and the transnational), turned out to be the 
preferred forum for many MEPs for both claims-making and policy conflict. 
Previous research has demonstrated that those elements play in many ways 
an even greater role on the European level than they do on the national one. 
While Littoz-Monnet (2013) argues that different political actors simply use 
the arena provided by the European institutions as additional platforms to 
promote their own memory discourses, Kattago (2009) and Challand (2009) 
stress the ontological importance of memory cleavages and debates in the 
European Parliament for making different interpretations of the past public 
and visible in order to legitimise political action. Closa (2010) similarly focuses 
1 Keywords used were: Memory, Second World War, Remembrance, Fascism/
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on the deliberative element within European debates that allows ‘memory 
entrepreneurs’ (political parties, formal and informal groups of MEPs, indi-
viduals, external actors) from Eastern European countries to make claims for 
recognition (see also the introduction to this special issue). Taking cues from 
this already existing research on mnemonic activism, and cross-investigating 
it with EP declarations and speeches, we can distil two main functions that 
the EP fulfils for many MEPs: it serves as a forum for a) politics of legitimation 
and b) politics of recognition.
Politics of Legitimation
The European Union was born – not exclusively but to a large extent – as a 
peace project in response to the experiences of war and dictatorship during 
the Second World War. Since the Schuman declaration on 9 May 1950, the 
determination to avoid another war among European nations has been central 
to the master narrative of the European Union and turned into a sort of 
‘founding myth’ (Beattie, 2007; Guisan, 2011). Evoked repeatedly in official 
documents and political speeches, the memories of intra-European conflict 
and aggression markedly influenced the set-up of the Union’s institutions. 
The EP was no exception to this rule. While the early years of European inte-
gration had been characterised by an overwhelmingly teleological narrative 
(Calligaro, 2014), after the end of the Cold War European politicians started 
to concentrate on the shared experiences of suppression and dictatorship, 
believing that the collective negative memory of two world wars could hold 
the European integration project together. Moreover, the commonality of 
those experiences, and in particular the Holocaust as the culmination of 
the horrors of the Second World War, started not only to be considered part 
of a de-nationalised cosmopolitan memory (Levy and Sznaider, 2002) but 
also turned into the central point of reference for defining the future values 
and political goals of the European Union. This becomes evident in all main 
EP resolutions on the Holocaust (European Parliament, 1993; 1995; 2001; 
2005b; 2006; 2009). The Holocaust turned into a sort of yardstick with which 
political developments are measured and evaluated. And it served to defend 
and legitimise political action, especially in foreign and security policy. For 
example, during the Balkan crisis and the unsuccessful NATO intervention in 
Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, military involvement in Kosovo was primarily 
framed as a moral obligation largely in response to previous European failures 















































































evident during disputes legitimising military interventions in Rwanda, Iraq, 
Libya, Syria or Afghanistan (Sierp, 2014).
Politics of Recognition
Closely connected to the politics of legitimation is the second element: politics 
of recognition. While the EP serves as a discussion arena for – at times – 
contested political decisions, it also serves as a forum for unresolved disputes 
about the interpretation of the past. That the same history can lead to very 
different evaluations of future action became evident from the moment ten 
Central and Eastern European countries joined the European Union in 2004. 
As they had experienced the end of the Second World War not as a liberation 
from dictatorship but rather as the beginning of a new period of repression, the 
requirement to accept the Western-dominated and EU-endorsed discourse on 
the memory of the Second World War was perceived as an imposition (Onken, 
2007). The EP was the main platform used by politicians from the new member 
states to put forward an alternative memory narrative, according to which 
the experiences of human suffering under Nazism and Stalinism are compa-
rable and should as such receive equal recognition. From the moment that 
representatives of several Central and Eastern European countries proposed 
to introduce a Day of Remembrance for the victims of Communism in the 
European remembrance calendar, the differences between the consolidated 
Western narrative and the Eastern request for recognition of their expe-
riences erupted in open parliamentary debate (Neumayer, 2015). The close 
analysis of the discussions preceding the introduction of this new European 
Remembrance Day reveals not only the increasing importance of the EP as a 
forum for claims-making, but also breaks with the observation made in other 
contexts that policy conflict in the EP is usually structured along national 
(‘newcomers’ versus ‘older’ member states), geographical (East versus West 
and North versus South) as well as ideological lines (right-wing versus left-
wing political groups). Instead, the debates surrounding the remembrance of 
European totalitarianisms cut across existing lines of division – a development 
that appears to be increasingly typical for memory issues on the European 
level (Sierp, 2017).
As previous research has shown (Kattago, 2009; Littoz-Monnet, 2012; Mälksoo, 
2009; Mink and Neumayer, 2013), the politicisation of debates over memory has 
accelerated after the Union’s membership increased from 15 to 25 members in 
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the deliberative battleground by putting the competition for memory claims 
into the frontlines of parliamentary debate. The pronouncement of soft memory 
laws increased after Enlargement, as did the amount of mnemonic activism 
within the European institutions. Especially Central and Eastern European 
MEPs used the arena provided by the EP to enact politics of legitimation 
and/or politics of recognition. Taking those two functions of the European 
Parliament as our starting point, we will investigate the mobilisation around 
memory of a to date understudied group: Italian MEPs.
The Case of Italy
The Role of Italy as a Mnemonic Actor in the EP
The fact that Italy was one of the founding members of what today is the 
European Union shaped its self-understanding of being part of the ‘core six’ 
or ‘core Europe’. On a symbolic level, the prominence of Italian politicians like 
Altiero Spinelli or Alcide De Gasperi during the early years of European inte-
gration markedly contributed to this feeling. Within the European Parliament 
(whose Brussels building is incidentally named after Altiero Spinelli), the 
Italian delegation has had between 72 (2009-2014) and 87 (1999-2004) seats. 
The majority have traditionally been affiliated to the European People’s 
Party (PPE-DE). This changed only in the 2014-2019 legislature, when Italian 
MEPs in the Socialist group (S&D, previously PSE) outnumbered those in the 
PPE-DE. Adherence to other party groups fluctuated together with domestic 
changes in the Italian party landscape (e.g. the appearance of the Movimento 
Cinque Stelle in the 2014-2019 legislature, boosting the number of Europe of 
Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) affiliates to 17). Furthermore, over 
the years there has been a frequent change of EP party group affiliation across 
parties. An example is the extreme right-wing party Union for the Europe of 
the Nations (UEN), whose Italian MEPs belonged to either Alleanza Nationale 
(AN) or Lega Nord (LN), and who in 2009 moved, respectively, to PPE-DE and 















































































Source: own graph, made with data obtained from the European Parliament’s 
overview of national results in all EP elections: <https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/election-results-2019/en/national-results/italy/1999-2004/ constitutive-
session/>. Parties are shown on a left/right spectrum.
As we have seen above, policy conflict in the EP is usually structured along 
national (‘newcomers’ versus ‘older’ member states), geographical (East versus 
West and North versus South) as well as ideological lines (right-wing versus 
left-wing political groups in the EP). While research on the mobilisation 
around the introduction of a Remembrance Day for the victims of European 
totalitarianisms indicates that the importance of those traditional lines of 
divisions in the EP diminishes when it comes to memory questions (Neumayer, 
2015; Sierp, 2017), the question of which role national party affiliation plays 
when researching a nationally and geographically homogeneous group (like 
the Italian MEPs) comes to the forefront. We expect to find that ideological 
leaning and national party affiliation play a considerable role whenever 
individuals or groups within the EP pursue two concrete goals: legitimation 
for contemporary, often nation-driven interests, and/or recognition and 
spotlight for specific community-bound experiences. As remembrance claims 
have become an increasingly frequent occurrence in European institutions, 
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Legitimising Policy Choices
As mentioned above, the European integration project has since the 1990s 
turned the Holocaust into the main yardstick by which European policies 
and political attitudes are judged. Politicians from all backgrounds have used 
its memory to legitimise their positions and actions. Our analysis of Italian 
activity in the EP demonstrates that Italian MEPs have also appealed to this 
strategy at points. Their usage of, or appeals to, the past, are nonetheless not 
limited to the Holocaust. The analysis reveals three main areas in which Italian 
MEPs have referenced the past in order to legitimise policy choices in the 
present: a) the experiences of the Second World War more broadly speaking, 
b) the memory of the founding fathers, and c) the Christian heritage of Europe.
The first category of references to the past to legitimise present political 
actions follows the trend of the European integration project: the narrative 
according to which the Second World War and the Holocaust are framed as 
the ‘founding events’ from which the contemporary EU grew. Traditionally, 
mnemonic activity in the EP has taken the shape of resolutions and proposals 
for the remembrance of the Holocaust2 as the main expression of the societal 
and human trauma that the EU’s member states are committed to never 
letting happen again (Littoz-Monnet, 2012). In the case of Italian mnemonic 
activity, the appeals to the remembrance of the Holocaust primarily took 
place within the context of the debates on the war on Iraq, in early 2003. More 
specifically, Italian speakers brought up the Holocaust as an argument in their 
comparisons of American foreign policy in the 1940s and the early 2000s. All 
of these interventions took place during the two extraordinary debates on the 
Iraq war on March 20 and 26, 2003, that is, in the week following the invasion 
of Iraq by American forces, aided by some European independent countries 
such as the UK and Denmark. 
Throughout these debates, four of the Italian speakers mentioned on multiple 
occasions the duty to remember the American intervention in the Second World 
War which had liberated both Italy and Europe and had made it possible to 
put an end to the Holocaust. These speakers were Mario Borghezio (2003a; 
2003b), non-aligned in the EP (NI) and member of Lega Nord in the Italian 
2 Such as the European Parliament (1993) Resolution on European and Inter-
national Preservation of the Sites of Nazi Concentration Camps as Historical 
Memorials, or the 1995 Proposal for a European Holocaust Remembrance 
Day (Debates of the European Parliament, Sitting on 15 May 1995, Holocaust 















































































parliament; Renato Brunetta (2003), member of PPE-DE and Forza Italia; 
Carlo Fatuzzo (2003), PPE-DE and Italian Pensioners’ Party; and Marco 
Pannella (2003a; 2003b; 2003d), NI and Radicali Italiani. According to these 
MEPs – all of (extreme) right-wing, conservative or liberal backgrounds3 –, 
the memory of how Europe had depended on, and benefited from, American 
foreign intervention in the 1940s legitimised the American decision to act in 
Iraq in the present. By referring to the EU’s founding events and traumas, they 
thus explicitly aligned the liberation of Europe, and Italy in particular, from 
fascism in the 1940s, with the liberation of Iraq from Hussein’s dictatorship 
in the 2000s. 
Out of the six Italian speakers who used the Second World War and the Holo-
caust as a framing device during the Iraq debates, the two remaining MEPs 
did so with the opposite intention: they wanted to denounce the American 
intervention as a violation of the EU raison d’être derived from the Holocaust. 
These two speakers were Renzo Imbeni (2003) and Luisa Morgantini (2003), 
who belonged, respectively, to the PSE and the European United Left/Nordic 
Green Left (GUE/NGL) in the EP, and Democratici di Sinistra and Partito della 
Rifondazione Comunista in the national sphere. In their view, the lessons learnt 
from the trauma of the Second World War, and the political commitments to 
which it had led in Europe, had been ignored and violated by the American 
intervention in Iraq. 
These examples of searching for political legitimation by appealing to the 
EU founding narrative demonstrate how malleable memory claims can be 
at institutional levels. The same events, and their derived trauma and learnt 
lessons, can be simultaneously used for opposite political goals depending 
on the framing of both the memories and the issue at hand. In this case, the 
value of the American intervention in Europe in the 1940s is ascribed by the 
contemporary context and the political orientation of the speaker. It thus 
comes as no surprise that arguments using the memory of past wars in favour 
of military intervention can be attributed mainly to speakers from the centre-
right, while all interventions arguing against came from left-wing MEPs. This 
is in line with findings on political communication on foreign policy issues in 
general and the Iraq war in particular (see Schuster and Maier, 2006; Mello, 
2012). It also corresponds to how the issue was debated on the national level 
in Italy (Focardi, 2005, 109).
3 Pannella stands out from this group as the leader of the Italian radical party, 
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A second category of references to the past where Italian MEPs’ activity stands 
out is with respect to the EU’s founding figures. Italy’s position as one of the 
core six countries involved in the European project from the very beginning 
seems to have lent many Italian MEPs a sense of historic righteousness, that 
is, a feeling that Italy’s decades-long national involvement in the EU justified 
and supported certain contemporary ideological positions or policy choices. In 
this regard, the fact that some of the most prominent ‘fathers of the European 
project’, such as Altiero Spinelli or Alcide De Gasperi, were Italian, has allowed 
MEPs to use their names as a resource that adds weight to arguments expressed 
in the assembly. For example, Spinelli’s original ideas were frequently referred 
to during the debates on the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 and 2005 by the 
Italian speakers. The Italian MEPs that purposefully used the names of Spinelli 
or De Gasperi to defend their position were all of socialist or liberal tradition: 
Alessandro Battilocchio (2005), NI in the EP and member of the New Italian 
Socialist Party; Giorgio Napolitano (2004), member of the Party of European 
Socialists (PSE) and Democratici di Sinistra; Marco Pannella (2004), NI and 
Radicali Italiani; and Mario Segni (2004), Union for Europe of the Nations 
(UEN) and Patto dei Liberaldemocratici. For them, the spirit behind their 
countrymen’s efforts in the 1950s was being smeared by the EP’s refusal to 
push forward a Constitutional Treaty that would finally “fulfil the federalist 
hopes of the founding fathers” (Pannella, 2004). During the same legislature 
(1999-2004), a similar argument was also used to defend the American military 
intervention in Iraq. According to MEP Marco Pannella (2003a; 2003c), the 
Americans’ action was consistent with the righteous stance of the founding 
fathers, including Spinelli, in their fight against fascism. The EP’s inactivity, 
on the other hand, was reminiscent of a “cowardly Europe, a Vichy’s Europe”, 
paralysed by – as MEP Mario Borghezio (2003), at the time NI in the EP and 
Lega Nord in Italy, puts it – “narrow-minded pacifists”.
A third, final dimension of using the past to legitimise contemporary choices 
in which Italian MEPs have had a leading voice in the EP is with regards to the 
Christian heritage of Europe. References appeared particularly in the context 
of negotiations preceding the Central and Eastern European enlargement. The 
perceived institutional failure to officially acknowledge Europe’s Christian 
roots was lamented together with the increasing religious diversity within 
Europe. On ten distinct occasions, all during the Fifth parliamentary term, the 
issue of Christian heritage being ignored by the EU institutions was brought 
to the fore of parliamentary discussions. Often, references came accompanied 
by political (and moral) statements. For example, support for the Iraq war 















































































free Germans or free Iraqis, instead of sacrificing everything to the moloch 
of peace” (Pannella, 2003b). In other cases, references to Europe’s heritage 
are an objective in itself. Italian MEPs – all from conservative parties, who 
have the values of Christianity inscribed in their national party programme 
– felt the Christian origin of Europe to be an important aspect of European 
identity (Berlusconi, 2003; Mauro, 2003; Muscardini, 2003; Speroni, 2000; 
Tajani, 2003). Italian MEPs also believed Europe’s Christian heritage should 
be explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitutional Treaty, if there was 
to be one. This is the case of Francesco Fiori (2003a; 2003b), PPE-DE/Forza 
Italia; Cristiana Muscardini (2003), UEN/Alleanza Nationale (AN); Antonio 
Tajani (2004), PPE-DE/Forza Italia. Although the amount of those claims 
diminished over time, they never went away fully: in 2009, Roberto Fiore (NI/
Forza Nuova), for example, likened a series of declarations by the then-chiefs 
of government Zapatero, Merkel and Sarkozy to an “emerging totalitarianism 
[…] quite radical when it comes to intervening to attack the Catholic Church”. 
The analysis of Italian discourses on the three elements explained above 
(EU founding figures, founding events and Christian heritage) demonstrates 
that Italian MEPs are far from reluctant to use mnemonic devices in their EP 
interventions. Their arguments using historical narratives as their basis are 
– if perhaps not overwhelming in numbers – explicit and blunt, with direct 
references to totalitarianism, the Holocaust or the shame of ‘Vichy’s Europe’ 
as weighted claims. Their use of the EU’s founding fathers and events corro-
borates Littoz-Monnet’s (2013) argument that the European fora (in this case 
the European Parliament) have become an additional platform for national 
politicians to push forward their own political discourse. Debates on the 
European (and thus also Italian) intervention in Iraq, for example, which was 
a nation-driven issue, acquired a new urgency and legitimation at the suprana-
tional level by bringing in the EU founding fathers and what ‘they would have 
done’. The use of these rhetorical devices is clearly determined by (national) 
party affiliations; Altiero Spinelli is mostly brought up by liberals and social 
democrats who see themselves as standing in the tradition of Spinelli’s ideas, 
whereas all the references to Christianity come from conservative parties. 
Their shared strategy to highlight ‘Europeanness’ in European institutions, 
furthermore, allows for concrete “illumination and renegotiation of the public 
past”, as Kattago (2009) and Challand (2009) note. By putting forward a rein-
terpretation of what the end of the Second World War meant to Italy, and of 
the role ascribed to the Allies who freed Italians from fascism, Italian MEPs 
continue to highlight their core role in the traumatic event that gave way to the 



















































• Aline sierp, lorenA ortiz cAbrero122
World War and the Holocaust remain the central points of reference for the 
values and goals guiding future European political action.
Recognising Italian Trauma
As we have seen above, the Italian experience of the Second World War is 
frequently referred to by Italian MEPs during policy debates (e.g. Borghezio, 
2003a; 2003b; Brunetta, 2003; Fatuzzo, 2003; Pannella, 2003a; 2003b; 2003d). 
While most comments fall within the EU-endorsed narrative about the Second 
World War, are not particularly contested and thus do not receive special 
attention by other representatives, references to one particular dimension 
of this experience caused considerable diplomatic quarrels every time it was 
mentioned: the Foibe massacres. These mass killings, during which an unde-
fined number of Italians were killed or disappeared by Yugoslav partisans, 
took place in Istria, Dalmatia and Venezia Giulia as a retaliation move between 
1943 and 1945. These events were the peak of Italo-Yugoslav ethnic conflict 
after three decades of Italian invasion and forced Italianisation by Italian 
Fascists, beginning in the midst of the Second World War and shortly after 
the Italian change of alliance. In the years following the massacres, approxi-
mately 300.000 Italians were exiled from Istria and Dalmatia, then part of 
the Yugoslav state (on the development of the multiple Foibe conflicts, see 
Baracetti, 2009; Bernardi, 2019).
Ever since, the Foibe killings have remained historiographically and popu-
larly contentious (Ballinger, 2003). As Baracetti (2009) explains, despite the 
advancement of research that provides a nuanced view of the events and their 
complex history, the more extreme interpretations (with either the Italians 
or the Yugoslavs being completely redeemed by the motivation behind their 
actions) remain strongly consolidated in the political and media spheres. In 
Italy, particularly, the framing of the Foibe has become an ideological dog-
whistle for the far-Right, and its remembrance has been a frequent point of 
contention both within national politics (Cossu, 2010; Ballinger, 2003; Bernardi, 
2019) and international relations with Slovenia and Croatia (Baracetti, 2009). 
As a forum for supra- and international European politics, the EP has also 
seen much interest in the Foibe, always and exclusively from the Italian side. 
The systematic analysis of Italian MEPs’ interventions shows that the topic 
of the Foibe became politically relevant just before and during the Eastern 















































































with Slovenia and then Croatia. The Fifth and Sixth European parliamentary 
terms (1999-2009) were characterised by tense interventions stemming from 
Italian demands to make the memory of the Foibe a key factor in the accession 
negotiations. These claims never made it formally into the accession docu-
ments, or even into any other resolutions or EP proposals. The only formal 
attempt was the proposal to include the Foibe as a ‘genocide’, alongside the 
Armenian one, in a 2005 motion for an EP resolution on anti-Semitism and 
racism (European Parliament, 2005a). This motion was put forward by two 
Italian MEPs – Romano Maria La Russa and Roberta Angelilli, both members 
of Alleanza Nationale (UEN in the EP), the party that had also brought the 
Foibe into domestic Italian political discourse (Cossu, 2009; 2010) –, as well 
as a Latvian MEP, Inese Vaidere, and Irish MEP Brian Crowley, both members 
of UEN. The motion did not pass the assembly. Nonetheless, despite the lack 
of supranational institutional resonance, Italian MEPs continued to bring up 
the memory of the Foibe until the final stages of the accession negotiations 
with Croatia in 2011 (i.e. La Russa, 2005; Borghezio, 2004; Buttiglione, 2000; 
Tajani, 2000; Angelilli, 2006; 2011a; 2011b). Only then, once all agreements with 
Croatia had been signed, and with Slovenia having joined the EU seven years 
back, did Italian MEPs stop making Foibe-related claims in the EP. During the 
active time frame, Italian MEPs emphasised particularly two elements: a) the 
inherent historic importance of the killings, and b) its contemporary political 
relevance for the protection of Italian minorities in Slovenia and Croatia.
Arguments for the historic importance of the Foibe massacres vary, but most 
of them stress that the events in Istria, Dalmatia and Venezia Giulia belong 
to Europe’s unresolved and unremembered tragedies. The strongest Italian 
discourse comes from the extreme right, using the term ‘Holocaust’ when 
describing the Foibe massacres. The claim that it was a form of ‘olocausto 
italiano’ (Italian Holocaust) first appeared on the national level (Knittel, 
2014) and was then transposed to the European one. Examples are the inter-
ventions by Romano Maria La Russa (2005), member of UEN and AN, who 
called the Foibe “one of the multiple other [holocausts] which are perhaps less 
well known but certainly no less serious”; or the words of Mario Borghezio 
(2004), NI/Lega Nord, who called “to mind the tragedies of totalitarianism of 
the last century”. In a similar fashion, multiple other Italian MEPs from the 
Centre-right, such as Rocco Buttiglione (2000), PPE-DE/Unione di Centro; 
Antonio Tajani (2000); or Roberta Angelilli (2006; 2011a; 2011b), UEN/PPE/
AN, called it a ‘series of crimes against humanity’ that had preceded the ethnic 
cleansing later seen in the Balkans. The Foibe perpetrators were thus on the 
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on the other with the ancient stereotype of the barbarian ‘Slav’ that practices 
uncivilized massacres. 
All statements, strengthened by the terminology used and the direct comparison 
made with both the Holocaust and the more recent Yugoslavian wars, were 
used to ask for official recognition of the tragedy by the European institutions. 
This recognition should be tripartite: the Slovenian and Croatian states are 
requested to recognise the role Yugoslav partisans played as perpetrators who 
have never admitted their fault, while the rest of Europe acted as bystanders 
who have largely ignored the events at both the cultural and the institutional 
levels. Given that all interventions were made by exponents of parties that 
at the time were in a coalition with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, together with 
Alleanza Nationale, it is not too surprising that the tone and argumentation 
of the centre-right MEPs are similar to the ones of the extreme Right quoted 
earlier. By using European memory markers (‘crimes against humanity’, 
‘holocaust’), national politics are thus projected onto the transnational level. 
For Italian MEPs, the Italian minority in Istria and Dalmatia continues to be 
historically castigated and claims for their protection therefore often appear 
in the context of resolutions and interventions on the general protection of 
minorities. For the Italian speakers, the main worries during debates on the 
Slovenian and Croatian accession were the right to bilingualism, the right to 
ownership of property, and economic compensation for hardship endured. 
The bilingual question, numerically least important in terms of amount of 
interventions (e.g. Gawronski, 2001; Podestà, 2001; both members of PPE-DE/
Forza Italia), was brought to the attention of both the EP and the European 
Commission after it was known that the national Croatian government was 
not willing to recognise the Italian language in the Croatian constitution. The 
second concern, property rights, was linked to the apparent discrimination in 
Croatia against Italian nationals that attempt to access the property market. 
Especially MEPs from extreme-right wing parties pointed out this issue. They 
were Cristiana Muscardini (2005b; 2006b), UEN/AN; Guido Podestà (2005), 
PPE-DE/Forza Italia; Roberta Angelilli (2006), UEN/AN; Mario Borghezio 
(2006), NI/Lega Nord; and Luca Romagnoli (2009a), NI/Movimento Sociale 
Fiamma tricolore. They stressed that this discriminatory act had been largely 
ignored by the same European institutions who would be outraged by its blatant 
violation of acquis communautaire if it had taken place in a different context.
It was not just discrimination in accessing the property market that continued 















































































latter was explicitly and repeatedly demanded over a span of five years, even 
shortly after Croatia had finalised their accession negotiations in mid-2011 
(Angelilli, 2006; 2011a; 2011b; Borghezio, 2006; 2009; 2011; Muscardini, 2006b; 
Romagnoli, 2009a; 2009b). MEPs highlighted the economic and personal loss 
that the Italian minority had suffered during and after the Second World War 
as consequence of both the killings and the exile, and asked for moral and 
monetary compensation. Others, coming mainly from centre-right parties, 
such as Sergio Silvestris (2011), PPE/Il Popolo della Libertà; Giovanni Collino 
(2011), PPE/AN; or Giovanni La Via (2011), PPE/Il Popolo della Libertà, 
acknowledged the progress of Croatian institutions in this domain but asked 
for further transparency and accountability when it came to property resti-
tution. It is striking that most of the discourses on restitution issues only appear 
during the accession negotiations with Croatia. During debates on Slovenia, 
the compensation of Italian victims played a role but lacked specific claims 
(e.g. Muscardini, 2001). Underlying all of the interventions – regardless of the 
political origin of their speakers – is the concern with the memory of the Foibe 
massacre as a tragedy whose consequences are still being felt in the Italian 
society (e.g. Angelilli, 2006; Serracchiani, 2010, S&D/Partito Democratico). 
Furthermore, Italian MEPs made it clear that not only the Slovenian or Croatian 
governments are to blame, but also the European institutions that have chosen 
not to give the Foibe the importance and focus of remembrance that it deserves. 
The most aggressive and explicit claims were made by representatives of the 
extreme Right, who lamented that “the European Union ha[d not] been at all 
interested in [n]or ha[d] protected the rights of the Italian minority or those of 
the Giulian-Dalmatian exiles” (Muscardini, 2006a). They argued that the EU 
seemed to hide behind the apparently bilateral nature of the issue, despite the 
fact that the affected community was after all a minority, and thus entitled to 
the special protection that the EU offers minorities in general. Other MEPs, 
although in less bold terms, also pointed out that this ‘bilateral problem’ was 
large enough to impede a smooth continuation of the accession negotiations 
(Romagnoli, 2009; Collino, 2010; Angelilli, 2011). They claimed that the EU 
must check that all aspects of the acquis communautaire were being respected, 
and that they could not support Croatian accession until they saw this enfor-
cement by the EU.4 This issue was brought to the EP’s attention no fewer than 
4 This line of argument is not unique to the Croatian accession. Similar discus-
sions took place during the accession of the Czech Republic with right-wing 
parties in Germany, Austria and Hungary calling for the controversial Benes 
decrees – legitimising the loss of citizenship and property of the German 
and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia – to be annulled before the 
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fourteen times throughout the negotiation period with both countries, usually 
during debates, in reaction to the progress reports that the EP rapporteurs 
presented on the upcoming enlargements, or as parliamentary questions 
(Gawronski, 2001; Muscardini, 2001; 2005b; Podestà, 2001; 2005; Angelilli, 
2006; Borghezio, 2006; 2011; Panzeri, 2007; Romagnoli, 2009a; 2009b; Collino, 
2010; Serracchiani, 2010). 
In other words, the claim for the institutional recognition of the tragedy that 
the Italian minority had endured had become a political bargaining tool, whose 
systematic presence in negotiations worked as a reminder of the power that 
Italy has in international decision-making. The seeming absence of the Left 
in those debates should not be confused with a general disengagement with 
memory issues. On the contrary, on the national level, left-wing politicians 
were heavily involved in support of President Ciampi’s attempts to rewrite the 
memory of the Resistance – a theme not addressed at all on the supranational 
level (Focardi, 2013, 51-90). Nonetheless, by the second half of the 2000s, 
Ciampi’s initiatives had slowly lost support and visibility in the political arena, 
and the Right – under the leadership of Berlusconi – solidified their claims 
and contributed to a revisionist attitude in Italian politics (Mattioli, 2011). 
It is this discursive dominance from the Right that we can observe in the EP 
during the Slovenian and Croatian accessions.
The analysis demonstrates that Italian MEPs utilised the European insti-
tutions, and the EP in particular, as a deliberative forum in which to bring 
their bilateral disputes with Slovenia and Croatia. One of the most striking 
examples of this was the diplomatic crisis that erupted in 2007 after Giorgio 
Napolitano called the Foibe massacre ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Vallerin, 2018, 14). 
After a sharp exchange of words on both sides, several Italian MEPs from UEN 
asked the Commission to officially condemn the reaction by Croat President 
Mesić as denial (Muscardini, 2007; Musumeci, 2007). (The Commission 
answered that it had no competences to act as mediator in those bilateral 
disputes.) By emphasising the European dimension of the Foibe and making 
reference to other historical tragedies (i.e. calling it the ‘Italian holocaust’ or 
the ‘precursor of the Balkan ethnic cleansings’), Italian MEPS furthermore 
aimed at political recognition for the Italian-speaking minorities in Istria 
and Dalmatia and the de-legitimisation of Slovenia and Croatia as ‘proper’ 
EU members. Until the arrival of Slovenia and Croatia to the EU circle, the 
Italian memory of the Foibe may have been largely secondary to the European 
memory framework, but there was also hardly any opposition to it. Slovenian 















































































very well have presented a competing narrative at the European level, poten-
tially even their own claim of an equivalent ‘holocaust’ carried out by Italian 
Fascists (Ballinger, 2003, 129). This would have put into question the idea that 
Italian Fascism was harmless and essentially an innocent version of German 
National Socialism. Thus Italian MEPs acted quickly and bluntly in their quest 
for European recognition of the Italian experiences in order to avoid any kind 
of discussion about Italian war crimes.
This competition between Italian and Slovenian-Croatian memories has taken 
on a dimension of bargaining power. The position of Italy as one of the historic 
founders of the European project has allowed them to (attempt to) influence 
the negotiation talks between the EU and Slovenia and Croatia, respectively, 
using memory as a bargaining tool by emphasising the faults of the latter 
and the duties of the former. These direct appeals to the EP were limited in 
time; once Slovenia and Croatia had joined the European Union, the Italian 
bargaining position lost power and the claims for concrete political action 
decreased in number until they eventually disappeared, in 2011, following 
the successful conclusion of Croatia’s accession agreements.
The Origins of Claims-Making
As we have seen above, research on the mobilisation of Central and Eastern 
European representatives demonstrated that debates in the EP are no longer 
necessarily structured along national, geographical or ideological lines. When 
investigating the data on the Italian interventions focused on memory, it 
becomes evident that this might not be true for claims coming from a geogra-
phically and nationally homogeneous group. Indeed, our research suggests that 
in this case we are dealing with a clear ideological divide determined more by 
national party affiliation than by European party group adherence. Amongst 
the 113 EP documents scrutinised, we found 75 references to the events and 
remembrance of the (post-) Second World War with an explicit connection 
to contemporary policies. Out of these 75 spoken occasions, 58 (77%) came 
from extreme-right, right or centre-right parties (in decreasing numerical 
importance, PPE-DE, NI (associated to right-wing Italian parties), UEN, IND/
DEM and TDI). Within these 75 interventions, we coded for the ones focused 
on the bilateral issues with Slovenia or Croatia. The result was 30 speeches, 
26 (87%) of which came from the aforementioned extreme right-wing and 
centre-right parties. As we have seen above, the tone of these interventions 
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recognition of the Italian trauma. On the other hand, the left-wing Italian 
MEPs, in addition to their numerically lower engagement with the topic (i.e. 
only 4 direct allusions to the Foibe), were markedly more moderate in tone, 
always highlighting the many efforts that Slovenia and Croatia were making 
to accommodate the European (including Italian) demands (see, for example, 
Panzeri, 2007; Serracchiani, 2010). The following table breaks down the 
interventions per party.
Memory-Related Interventions Istria/Dalmatia-Related Interventions
PPE-DE 26 PPE-DE 12
UEN 11 UEN 6
PSE 8 PSE 3
GUE/NGL 7 GUE/NGL 0
S&D 2 S&D 1
NI 18 NI 7
IND/DEM 2 IND/DEM 1
TDI 1 TDI 0
Total 75 Total 30
This suggests that claims-making in the context of memory issues seems to 
fall into the domain of the right-wing parties. Of course, the composition of 
the EP needs to be taken into account when analysing the data. The largest 
group of Italian MEPs in the EP during the time period under investigation 
was part of the PPE-DE party group and thus also received more speaking 
time than other groups. If one considers that the European Parliament is often 
used by MEPs to foreground national debates in order to seek recognition or 
legitimation, this result is thus not too surprising, since the Italian domestic 
debate on the contested history of the killings in the Foibe and the expulsion 
of the Italian minority in Istria and Dalmatia has been largely dominated by 
the Right, both centre-right and extreme-right (Mattioli, 2011).
In the 1990s and 2000s, this debate took a markedly revisionist tone, which 
sought to undermine the established societal and international agreement 
consolidated in the 1975 Treaty of Osimo (Mattioli, 2011). This Treaty, signed by 
Italy and Yugoslavia, cemented the partition of the region, proposed economic 
cooperation and indemnities for exiles, as well as protection for Slovene and 
Italian minorities (Ballinger, 2003, 93). It was Gianfranco Fini (Alleanza 
Nationale), at the time Foreign Minister in the Berlusconi government, who 
proposed to revise the ‘confine orientale’ putting into question the Treaty of 
Osimo. Indeed, Mirko Tremaglia, President of the Foreign Affairs Commission 















































































openly that Italy was under no obligation any more to respect the treaty since 
it had been signed with a state that had ceased to exist (Mattioli, 2011, 52). 
Seen in this context, the activism of the Italian MEPs seems to be very much 
dictated by foreign policy considerations. By moving part of the national 
discussions into the European arena, right-wing politicians are expanding 
their room for manoeuvre and trying to score additional points at home. That 
this strategy could potentially backfire if Slovenes and Croats asked in turn for 
an investigation into Italian war crimes seems not to bother those politicians, 
and indicates the perceived weakness of the European Parliament.
Another example of the Right’s engagement in the debate is the introduction, in 
2004, of a new Memorial Day in honour of the Martiri delle Foibe – the victims 
of the killings perpetrated mainly by Yugoslav partisans that took place in 
Istria during and shortly after the Second World War. The introduction of this 
new commemorative day was arguably only possible while Silvio Berlusconi’s 
centre-right coalition was in government. In fact, the idea to create a specific 
day commemorating the Foibe was markedly pushed by Alleanza Nationale, 
the extreme right party in Berlusconi’s coalition. Choosing February 10th, 
the date on which the peace-treaty that sanctioned Italy’s loss of her eastern 
territories was signed in 1947, was certainly no coincidence, and it explicitly 
connected the Foibe massacres to the expulsion of more than 300.000 Italians 
from the territories that are today in Slovenia and Croatia. The analysis of 
the domestic debates shows that there was no opposition from the centre-left 
forces to the bill proposing the creation of a Memorial Day. According to Andrea 
Cossu (2010, 14), the introduction of the new Memorial Day was endured rather 
than accepted by the Left, whereas the Right asserted its symbolic ownership 
over the way it should be celebrated. 
Overall, since 2010, the debate has solidified into two different memory cultures 
with regards to the Foibe: one with a strong ultranational slant promoted by 
the Right, and one focused on reconciliation between the Balkan states and 
Italy, advocated for by Giorgio Napolitano and the Left (Vallerin, 2018).5 The 
debates in the EP seem to have followed a very similar pattern, with the debates 
being structured along the same lines of arguments that could be observed 
in the national context. Indeed, the close analysis of the origin of the claims 
put forward reveals that Italian MEPs in many instances simply uploaded 
5 One needs to mention that Giorgio Napolitano three years earlier had 
caused a diplomatic crisis when he called the Foibe the result of “a Slavic 
annexationist move that prevailed above all in the 1947 Peace Treaty and 
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their national discourse to the European level. The fact that they often did 
not necessarily follow the line of their respective European party group but 
rather the logic of coalition-building in the national sphere (vividly seen during 
Berlusconi’s term in office, whose centre-right coalition comprised exponents 
of the extreme Right), proves the importance national party affiliation can 
play in certain circumstances.
Conclusion
Since the 1990s, European institutions have promoted the Second World War 
and the Holocaust as a traumatic lesson that Europe learnt and can now ‘teach’ 
to other countries (Littoz-Monnet, 2012). Italian MEPs from all ideological 
backgrounds thus use the existing EU discourse on the Second World War and 
the Holocaust in order to legitimise policy choices. Paradoxically, the discourse 
on the uniqueness of the Holocaust is complemented by the demand of some 
Italian MEPs to treat the Foibe as a ‘minor holocaust’. This claim ‘overlaps’ to 
a certain extent with the Eastern European efforts to raise other (Stalinist) 
crimes to the same level of importance and trauma as the Nazi Holocaust. 
Some Italian interventions explicitly supported this comparative framework 
between Stalinism and Nazism (e.g. Borghezio, 2009b). This suggests that 
Eastern European MEPs have succeeded in putting their framework centre-
piece encouraging other countries’ MEPs to put forward their own memory 
narrative, thus adding another piece to the grand mosaic of the ever-changing 
European memory framework (see introduction by the two guest editors).
Moreover, through their consolidation of the Istrian and Dalmatian mino-
rities as communities that require supranational protection from the states 
in which they live, Italian MEPs have cemented and favoured the agenda-
setting dynamics between regions and EU institutions. In particular, they 
have given voice to the regionalist drive of Giulian-Dalmatian associations, 
whose parameters for remembrance marked from 2003 onwards the official 
Italian commemoration of the Foibe on February 10th. They thus favoured the 
regional embracing of the EU for regionalist or nationalist purposes (Keating 
and Hooghe, 2006, 272).
The choice of the EP as a forum for the remembrance of the Foibe and the Italian 
exodus after the national context had been exhausted confirms the tendency 















































































502). By bringing the issue of remembrance and compensation into multiple 
political venues, both at national and supranational levels, Italian politicians 
– overwhelmingly from the Right – increased their visibility and reached out 
to a larger crowd of potential supporters who could, hypothetically, legitimise 
their claims. By doing so, they asserted ownership over the EU framework by 
uploading their own memories of the past into the European policy discourse. 
Whether these parliamentary interventions successfully gathered external 
(non-Italian) support is a different matter. Our research indicates that none of 
the Foibe-related claims made during the accession negotiations with Slovenia 
and Croatia were particularly well received by the other EU members. While 
the blunt seeking of validation, acknowledgement and recognition of specific 
national historical experiences is often challenged by (trans)national political 
actors, in the Italian case silence predominated. All the Italian demands were 
neither rebuked nor accepted. Some of the most vocal Italian MEPs even 
elevated complaints about how a) the other countries’ MEPs did not take their 
interventions in the EP seriously (Podestà, 2005), and b) the Italian minorities 
that they were attempting to protect had been abandoned by EU institutions 
in general (Muscardini, 2006a). 
The fact that the European institutions remained unresponsive to the claims 
of the Italian Right, despite having adopted the antitotalitarian paradigm 
also promoted by the Central and Eastern European countries, can only be 
explained by the obvious one-sidedness of the Italian claims, who deliberately 
disregarded the wider historical context (see also Vallerin, 2018). In none of 
the references to the Foibe the antecedent of the massacres was mentioned, 
namely the brutal occupation and war crimes committed by Italian fascists in 
former Yugoslavia in the 20 years preceding the massacres. It is very likely that 
actors in the EU institutions tried to avoid any kind of public discussion that 
would jeopardize the accession of, and future relationship with, the former 
Yugoslav states. They thus preferred to entrust the discussion to the respective 
national governments, to whom they ascribed “buone relazioni di vicinato” 
(good neighbourly relations) (Füle, 2012). Nonetheless, and as demonstrated by 
the words of EP President Tajani, who during a commemorative service in 2019 
shouted “Long live Trieste, long live Italian Istria, long live Italian Dalmatia, 
long live Italian exiles” (Barigazzi, 2019), the Italian efforts to include Istria 
and Dalmatia in a collective European memory have not died out.6 They will 
most likely continue to fuel bilateral tensions with Slovenia and Croatia also 
6 Interestingly, Tajani was the only Italian MEP who signed the EP resolution 
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in the future, despite a mutual interest in reconciliation, as evidenced by the 
joint commemoration of the Presidents of Italy and Slovenia, Mattarella and 
Pahor, of the victims of the Foibe on 13 July 2020 (Vecchio, 2020).
Our research shows that Italian MEPs might have remained on the margins of 
most of the main European Parliament initiatives regarding memory politics. 
However, whenever they did get involved, they used memory as a bargaining 
tool to push forward specific national interests. Their rhetorical strategies 
followed the ideological lines usually present in the national sphere (e.g. left-
wing parties against military intervention, Christian democrats pushing 
for an institutional recognition of Europe’s Christian roots, etc.), and they 
“uploaded” burning issues from the Italian arena into the European one, such 
as the memory of the Foibe. These findings demonstrate that the analysis of 
mnemonic activity in European fora requires the nuance provided by the 
national context, as well as ideological and geographical considerations, if we 
are to understand why and how European political actors use the mnemonic 
tools at their disposal.
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